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Clark: Darwin Would Be Justifiably Proud

FORUM

DARWIN WOULD BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD
Ronald E. Clark

As the international aviation community awaits U.S. government action on the report of the National
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry (1993), Charles Darwin would be justifiably
proud. The obvious survival-of-the-fittest struggle that many U.S. airlines have faced since deregulation and
the evolutionary posture of a growing group of profitable carriers, led by Southwest Airlines, seem to be a
fulfillment of his theories.
With the meteoric rise of Federal Express to billiondollar-revenue status, a model of competitiveness
emerged. United Parcel Service, as if using the book
written by Japan in the 19708 and 1980s, implemented a
copycat corporate strategy that has carried it to a
position of near-parity with once-dominant FedEx. This
lesson, which is not an innovative corporate model by
any means, is beginning to be learned by the U.S. airline
industry.
What might be called the Southwest Airlines model
of profitability is being copied to some extent by many
emerging carriers, such as Morris, Reno, and Kiwi. If
current rumors are true, American, United, USAir and
other major U.S. carriers are examining the feasibility of
a point-to-point domestic strategy and may soon unveil
plans similar to those of Southwest. If restructuring
happens, it will be refreshing to see ego-abatement
occur, replacing the cutthroat fare wars that were
destined, if not designed, to clear the marketplace of the
Darwinian spoils. To adopt the Southwest model is, in
the long run, a more viable alternative.
There seems to be a political moratorium on the use
of the word "reregulation." Whether this silence comes
from the "history, please be proud of us" mentality of the
deregulation founders, or from current political thinking
in Congress and the Clinton!pena camp, is unknown.
What is known and well documented is that U.S. airline
deregulation has not worked as originally intended. As
Paul Dempsey accurately perceives, the 3% market share
success of Southwest Airlines is certainly not to be taken
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as an indication of the overall success of deregulation
(Dempsey et aI., 1993).
Two points are worthy of mention. First, the
Southwest model of U.S. airline profitability should be
broadly adhered to as an enduring philosophy of
domestic operations by the industry; that is, not as a
token gesture, but as a restructuring effort, from the
ground floor up. Second, the Department of Transportation or some new entity should have oversight of
those areas the market is unable or unwilling to
self-regulate. Rather than blame the culprits, whoever
they are, we need to repair and recover instead. The ills
of the past 15 years of U.S. airline deregulation are
common knowledge. Each of these faults has viable
solutions short of the reregulation methods of the
1938-1978 era. It is clear, as international airline CEOs
have recently indicated, that ego control by U.S. airline
CEOs has fallen short of the mark. Holmes (1993)
believes that the majors are still fascinated with playing
the game of monkey see, monkey do. Today, the top
"monkey" is in trouble with its board of directors, is not
viewed as the "fittest," and may not survive.
Just what is this Southwest model? Morton Beyer'S
study What is Really Wrong With America'sAir Carriers or
The Secret ofSouthwest Airlines (1993) tells much of the
story. Here are a few of the key elements of Southwest
CEO Herb Kelleher's trend-setting model:
1. Market-bottom prices based only on profitability
margin, not on yield management.
2. Industry-leading safety concerns.
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3. Employee/customer focus leadership management style.
4. Single type aircraft operations.
5. All aircraft models configured alike (type ratings
similar).
6. "No frills" nutritional service.
7. Keen, insightful marketing.
8. Opportunistic, bulk purchasing (aircraft paint
scheme).
9. Fifteen-minute gate turnaround.
10. Young aircraft fleet.
11. Slow, conservative company growth.
12. Low people-to-aircraft ratio.
13. Internal computer reservation system (deal direct
with Southwest).
14. Credit card ticketing machines.
15. Minimal gate personnel.
16. All flights are point-to-point (hub/spoke system
costly).
17. Daytime operations only (minimal night operations).
18. Shamu the killer whalelLone Star State aircraft
paint scheme.
19. Employee profit-sharing.
20. Pro-personnel policies mean happy employees.
21. Nepotism encouraged.
22. No first class-one class for all
23. Ensure quarterly/annual profitability.
There are viable alternatives for major U.S. air
carriers to maintain profitability. Instead of searching
willy-nilly for costly alternatives such as increased luxury,
the carriers must look at adopting a model such as
Southwest's that has proven highly successful.
Airline deregulation prophets have not been heeded
thus far. The loudest of these is Paul Dempsey, who has
been shouting "repent!" to all who would listen. Dempsey
heads a group of aviation experts called Americans for
Sound Aviation Policy (ASAP) that is dedicated to fixing

what the National Commission chose and still chooses to
ignore (Dempseyet al., 1993).
Alan Bender (1993) has stirred up controversy with
an insightful article in the editorial pages of Aviation
Week & Space Technology. Bender stated that the majors
are inefficient and he predicted that electronic
technology would increasingly ground business travelers,
causing a drop in the market. The article resulted in an
angry, if misguided, backlash based on job security.
In addition, consider Southwest's recent expansion
into the East Coast market (Ott, 1993). If this news was
not enough of a warning to the ego-managed majors,
Southwest's purchase of the Boeing 737-700 should have
sent shivers through the boardrooms of major airlines
(Proetor, 1993). Rumors of the Big Three leaving the
domestic American market to seek continued success and
survival overseas is not so remote a thought now. It is
painful to imagine that reluctance to adapt might cause
major airlines to become as extinct as the dinosaurs of
Jurassic Park. Darwin might be proud, but also
remorseful.
Southwest Airlines is not perfect, and is subject to
the same laws of industrial evolution that affect its more
nearsighted competitors. Articles critical of Southwest
Airlines' pricing inflation have begun to appear in the
trade media, applauding deja vu-like the appearance of
the new regional airlines. Such competition will only
keep the Kelleher crew alert and lean. In the meantime,
the bell is tolling for the rest of the industry. The
message is unmistakable: Profitability is the bottom line.
Kelleher, like W. Edwards Deming who took the
ideas of total quality management to a more receptive
Japan, may find that U.S. airlines today will react in a
more timely manner than did U.S. businesses of the
previous 30 years.
The ads say, "Which way do we head? Southwest!"
Similarly, it might be said, What is to be our ultimate
focus? Profitability!c
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